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Confronted with complex and wicked issues, public authorities turn to science
and expertise to provide answers that will help reduce the level of uncertainty
that characterizes these issues. Yet, the paper argues that more often than not, it
is the application of a risk framework to a given issue that fosters uncertainty,
not the other way round. Hence, the more authorities and experts attempt to
apply a risk approach to an issue, the more they encourage the production of
uncertainty. Taking mobile telephony as a case in point, the paper then goes on
to show that to reduce uncertainties, authorities in some countries have recently
experimented with new forms of knowledge in the process of expertise; para-
doxically, this may raise in a ﬁrst moment the general level of uncertainty, but it
may also provide in the longer term more robust knowledge. The larger aim of
the paper is to expand conceptions of uncertainty commonly used in risk gover-
nance.
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There is little agreement across the social sciences on deﬁnitions of risk and uncer-
tainty – let alone on how these two notions relate to each other. This in turn reﬂects
a wide range of uses across scientiﬁc disciplines, public administrations, private
ﬁrms, independent regulatory agencies and civil society actors – the sum total of
which contributes to numerous misunderstandings and confusion.
In what follows, risk will be understood as a quality ascribed, through a social
process, to an object (Borraz 2008). This quality implies that something of human
value is at stake, yet the outcome remains uncertain (Rosa 2003, 56). The important
point to remember is that by framing an object as a risk, it is made governable. Fur-
thermore, whereas traditionally the process leading to the qualiﬁcation was in the
hands of experts (Hilgartner 1992), it now tends to pit organizations or groups
against each other: i.e. it is a contended social process.
A central element in this process is the notion of uncertainty. Beck and Giddens
use the terms risk and uncertainty indistinctively to characterize the consequences
of the growing pace of science and technology (Beck 1998; Giddens 1998).
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Nevertheless it is important to differentiate the two notions and to adopt a broader
understanding of uncertainty encompassing both its relation to knowledge and its
social dimensions. Accordingly, we will rely on the deﬁnition proposed by van
Asselt: uncertainty refers to a lack of knowledge and the difﬁculty to predict future
events, outcomes and consequences (van Asselt 2000). A key difference between
risk and uncertainty is that, whereas the former is governable, the latter is not. To
govern an object fraught with uncertainties requires the use of techniques, proce-
dures and instruments that will convert these uncertainties into dimensions that can
be acted upon.
Risk frameworks offer such techniques. We refer herein to the set of standards,
protocols and guidelines that deﬁne how risk objects should be assessed, evaluated,
managed, communicated and monitored. These frameworks aim at identifying and
reducing uncertainties, by converting them into a risk, calling for more research or
discarding them as insigniﬁcant. The process relies primarily on experts, namely
scientists, who have the authority and capacity to characterize and assess uncertain-
ties and decide whether they warrant the qualiﬁcation of an object as presenting a
risk or not.
However, this process has come under divergent sets of pressures on each side
of the Atlantic. In the US, starting in the 1970s, large private interests
(e.g. tobacco and chemical manufacturers) engaged in a highly sophisticated strat-
egy to ‘manufacture uncertainty’, in order to delay or block any science-based regu-
lation (Michaels 2008; McGarity and Wagner 2008; Oreskes and Conway 2010).
They were able to suggest that on many objects being reviewed for stricter regula-
tion, too many scientiﬁc uncertainties persisted to be able to establish a clear causal
link between the object and health effects; hence, there was no sufﬁcient ground for
regulation. This strategy was developed in reaction to a regulatory process put into
place during the early 1970s, with the aim of regulating risks in the environment
and the workplace through the identiﬁcation and reduction of uncertainties (Boudia
2009). In Europe, some 20 years later, the picture is different. The growth of uncer-
tainty in this case is directly linked to the multiplication of controversies surround-
ing new technologies; a key argument of opponents to genetically modiﬁed
organisms (GMOs) or mobile telephony, for example, being that the breadth of the
uncertainties justiﬁes that these technologies be considered as a risk and conse-
quently governed under the precautionary principle (Borraz 2008). Hence, while on
one side of the ocean the manufacture of uncertainty serves to avoid regulating an
object as a risk, on the other, it is precisely because an object is fraught with uncer-
tainties that it qualiﬁes as a risk and calls for political action. In both cases, only if
an object has been deﬁned as a risk can it be governed.
What this implies is the need to pay more attention to the role of uncertainty in
risk regulation. More precisely, the situation on both sides of the Atlantic suggests
that the production of uncertainty can only be understood in relation to the proce-
dures designed to analyse and regulate risks (which they have often later contrib-
uted to reform). Hence, in this paper, we wish to give a more precise account of
the way in which applying a risk framework to a new technology in Europe actu-
ally increased the level of uncertainty and triggered a controversy. We will then
show that experts and government ofﬁcials have begun to acknowledge these unin-
tended effects of risk regulation procedures, and experimented with alternative
modes of dealing with the knowledge and uncertainties pertaining to new, contro-
versial technologies. This in turn suggests that we may be in the midst of a shift in
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the governance of new technologies, one that recognizes the necessity to include a
wider range of evidence and to engage with a larger set of stakeholders and scien-
tiﬁc disciplines. We will conclude that by acknowledging the existence of multiple
uncertainties, governments will in the end be led to recognize their inherently social
and political nature.
We will use the case of mobile telephony as an illustration. As an issue, it has
been on the agenda of European governments, the European Union (EU) and the
World Health Organization (WHO) for over a decade now. Countless expert reports
have come out, followed by numerous governmental action plans, without the prob-
lem showing any sign of phasing-out. Indeed, as governments have actively sought
a solution to this issue, they have turned it into a ‘wicked problem’ (Rittel and
Webber 1973). More recently, along with GMO, mobile telephony has become a
‘testing ground’ for the development of new forms of governance.
This paper rests on extensive research on controversies over mobile phone
antennas in France, combined with research on the regulation of mobile phone risks
in ﬁve European countries: Belgium, France, Spain, Switzerland and the UK
(Borraz and Salomon 2007, 2009; Borraz 2008). It also relies on existing literature
on the topic, participation in various committees and several encounters with French
and international bodies in charge of regulating this issue.
Risk and uncertainty in mobile telephony
The issue of mobile telephony arrived on the agenda of European governments and
the Commission in the late 1990s–early 2000s. Whereas in the US the controversy
focused on the handsets, in Europe the antennas were and remain the major source
of concern. The issue was spurred by local protest against existing sites or projected
constructions of mobile phone antennas for a variety of reasons including aesthetic
concerns, loss of property value, threats to civil liberties, or lack of public consulta-
tion on the siting of antennas (Burgess 2004).
Nevertheless, rather than consider that protest movements against a handful of
antennas (vs. the tens of thousands being rolled out) were ‘normal’ and predictable,
the European Commission and governments across Europe interpreted these protests
as a potential source of crisis. Mobile phone operators followed closely in step.
Several reasons can account for these actors’ perception of mobile telephony as an
issue, including: the fact that mobile telephony had aroused media interest following
a lawsuit in the US against mobile phone makers, on the grounds that the handsets
could present a risk of brain tumours1; the risks related to mobile telephony (hand-
sets and antennas alike) echoed ongoing debates over the risks of high voltage
power lines (and childhood leukaemia, in particular); the issue arose in a wider con-
text of increased concern for environmental health risks, following recent crises
(mad cow, asbestos, food safety, GMO); parliaments were eagerly picking up this
issue to show their concern for protecting the health of citizens against government
ofﬁcials accused of siding too often with powerful economic interests. For all these
reasons, the issue was quickly identiﬁed as a potential source of contention – one
which could furthermore hinder the development of mobile telephony at a time
when this technology was encountering an unprecedented success and beneﬁted
from strong support from the European Commission and national governments.
This triggered an uninterrupted series of expert reports, conferences and publi-
cations, from European institutions, member states and WHO during the next ten
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years. Regulatory measures, research programmes and intensive media coverage
followed. However, far from removing the issue from the agenda, its position as
a health priority for public ofﬁcials was reinforced. How can this be accounted
for?
Almost from the beginning, the issue was framed as a potential health risk –
rather than as an environmental, planning or even aesthetic problem. In a context of
health scandals and crises, public ofﬁcials singled out the potential health risks of
mobile telephony and undertook to address them separately from the rest of the
issue. Yet, this initial framing was misleading as many protest movements did not
start out by focusing on health – indeed in many cases, this was simply not a con-
cern (Burgess 2004). However, as the problem was framed as a health issue, oppo-
nents to antennas were encouraged to work with alternative experts and activists
engaged in struggles against the risks of electromagnetic ﬁelds. The latter argued
that there was a sound basis for considering that there existed a health risk, and that
furthermore, it would be a mistake for governments, following the mishandlings of
the mad cow and asbestos scandals, to neglect the data suggesting such possible
harm to health. Faced with what was now turning into a major controversy, public
authorities turned to scientiﬁc experts to reinforce their evidence base.
The majority of expert reports concluded that, whereas the handsets could theo-
retically pose a health risk, antennas presented no risks whatsoever: i.e. not only
was the existence of a risk not established, given the state of the science, but it was
also theoretically implausible given the low levels of emissions produced by anten-
nas often operating far away from individuals (either from masts or rooftops). These
reports were immediately contested by activists and counter-experts on the grounds
that they: relied on scant scientiﬁc evidence; refused to take into account studies
undertaken by ‘independent’ scientists that, whilst not published in scientiﬁc jour-
nals, pointed to the existence of health risks; neglected evidence of all sorts pro-
vided by alternative experts, activist movements and local protesters that mobile
phone antennas produced health effects amongst neighbouring populations. Yet,
ofﬁcial experts preferred to focus on peer-reviewed results published in scientiﬁc
journals to establish their assessment, thus shedding light on just a small portion of
the issue at hand. In so doing, they fuelled the controversy as it was easy for oppo-
nents to suggest that conﬂicts of interests were behind this choice to limit the analy-
sis to a small number of studies. In the case of mobile telephony, the small number
of experts on this topic and the fact that many had worked on projects ﬁnanced by
private operators facilitated this critique. Hence, the more expert reports undertook
to close the controversy, the more they fuelled alternative reports and contestation
that resulted in the widespread perception of a very uncertain technology.
Meanwhile, many of the factors that partook in the emergence of mobile tele-
phony as a risk were simply discarded by expert committees, on the grounds that
they could not be assessed scientiﬁcally. These factors referred in particular to the
behaviour of the different actors in the rollout schemes (e.g. private operators, con-
struction companies, local and state ofﬁcials, property owners), the causes of local
protests, or the characteristics of the places in which mobilizations occurred (Calvez
2011). They were not processed in the risk assessment framework because they
were not judged to be scientiﬁc issues and because social scientists capable of
assessing these factors were not in the expert committees. Accordingly, local protest
movements kept multiplying at a steady pace, in some countries strongly hindering
the deployment of mobile telephone networks (e.g. Spain). And health became a
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central concern of many of these movements, as it represented a decisive argument
in getting attention from public ofﬁcials.
Furthermore, the controversies also revealed divergent values, ideas and world-
views. Again, the expert groups, who had no capacity to assess the beneﬁts of the
issues being discussed, could not address these and focused on the (potential) risks
as if they were disconnected from the outside world. In the case of mobile tele-
phony, few, if any, of the expert reports tried to assess the beneﬁts of this new tech-
nology, apart from some vague and general statements; let alone discuss the
opportunity of putting such a technology on the market and developing new uses at
a rapid pace. This gave activist movements the possibility to link the issue to wider
debates on the governance of new technologies or the role of science in modern
society, or to hook up to other issues such as GMO, in so doing mustering further
support for their cause.
To sum up, efforts by public administrations to apply a risk framework to the
issue at hand ampliﬁed the controversies and turned the issue into a wicked prob-
lem. As Rittel and Webber observe, a wicked problem is ill-deﬁned, ambiguous and
associated with strong moral, political and professional issues; it is stakeholder
dependent, i.e. there is often little consensus on what the problem is, let alone how
to resolve it; it will not keep still: it is a set of complex, interacting issues evolving
in a dynamic social context; ﬁnally, new forms of wicked problems emerge as a
result of trying to understand and solve one of them (Rittel and Webber 1973, 160–
7). This is precisely the case with mobile telephony.
More importantly, although countries have adopted diverging positions, some
following the EU recommendation2 and ICNIRP3 levels of exposure (e.g. UK,
France, Spain), others adopting lower ‘precautionary’ standards (e.g. Belgium,
Switzerland, Italy), this has had little impact, not only on the overall controversy
but also on the situation within these countries. In all these cases, a strictly scien-
tiﬁc approach fuelled a controversy over the uncertainties left out.
Hence, public authorities in many countries have come to realize that this issue
would not disappear in the near future from their agenda. The same acknowledge-
ment applied to GMO. Public authorities understood that to govern these objects
and their potential risks implied learning to live with these risk issues and the
continuing controversies surrounding them.
Bridging the gap between risk and uncertainty: a pluralist approach
Almost from the beginning, as the controversy unfolded, public ofﬁcials and experts
turned to social scientists specialized in the study of risk perceptions and risk com-
munication in order to better understand popular representations and to develop
more effective communication schemes. For the most part, these produced limited
and disappointing results. Nonetheless, national governments, the European Com-
mission and WHO remained (and often still remain) steadfast in their pursuit of a
communication strategy capable of settling the controversy.
Alongside these efforts, initiatives surfaced in various countries (namely France,
Belgium, the UK, Sweden and Switzerland) that mark an attempt to address the
multiple uncertainties mentioned earlier. These initiatives do not partake in the pro-
duction of an integrated approach, but rather remain dispersed. By bringing them
together, we wish to suggest that they contribute to a renewed understanding of risk
issues. These initiatives cover three dimensions: (1) the types of knowledge used;
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(2) who should provide the knowledge; (3) the scientiﬁc and political procedures
processing this knowledge.
Types of knowledge
Given the multiple uncertainties around emerging risks, it may be important to
gather as much information as possible from as many different sources as possible,
in order to get a clearer idea of the problem. This implies acknowledging the fact
that scientiﬁc evidence, and more precisely, peer-reviewed results, offer only a lim-
ited understanding of the many unknowns, let alone all the other factors that
account for the qualiﬁcation of the issue as a risk. Thus, the UK independent expert
group on mobile telephony in 2000 makes the following recommendation:
We recommend that in a rapidly emerging ﬁeld such as mobile phone technology
where there is little peer-reviewed evidence on which to base advice, the totality of
the information available, including non-peer-reviewed data and anecdotal evidence,
be taken into account when advice is proffered.4
The fact that the Stewart committee, as it is better known, advocated the need
to take into account a large range of evidence stemmed directly from the mishan-
dling of the BSE crisis by the British government: the Stewart report came out dur-
ing the inquiry by Lord Phillips and William Stewart himself had been chief
scientiﬁc ofﬁcer during the period of the BSE crisis. He was careful to avoid prior
mistakes and notably an excessive reliance on mainstream science alone in the face
of multiple uncertainties (Stilgoe 2004).
These additional types of knowledge fall under three general categories.
The ﬁrst category is made up of non peer-reviewed studies. The community of
experts does not consider these studies to be scientiﬁc, as they have not been
through a process of validation or replication (or have failed to meet their stan-
dards). Nevertheless, these studies rely on scientiﬁc methods to suggest the exis-
tence of possible risks. In the case of mobile telephony, this covers a wide range of
reports that have come out over the years. Some expert groups, for example, in
Switzerland (Krueger report in 1998) and the UK (Stewart report in 2000), have
taken their results into consideration to provide an overall assessment. In the Swiss
case, this was encouraged by the 1983 law on environmental protection, which
states that all potential sources of nuisance should be reduced to as low as (techni-
cally and economically) feasible; accordingly, any evidence suggesting a nuisance is
a legitimate motive for reduction. However, in most other cases, scientiﬁc experts,
careful to provide an advice based solely on valid science, systematically discarded
these ‘non-scientiﬁc’ studies. Yet, given on the one hand their potentially high
media impact (their authors suggesting that their results run counter to other studies
ﬁnanced by industry, and that this is the reason why they were not published or
reproduced), and on the other the growing awareness of the many remaining
unknowns (notably on non-thermal effects of radiofrequencies), some expert groups
were pressured into paying more attention to these studies. Thus, several groups or
committees commissioned on mobile telephony in Germany, the Netherlands or
France decided to take into consideration (even if to produce a negative evaluation)
the controversial 2007 BioInitiative report.5 In a similar vein, a 2009 report by the
French environmental health safety agency acknowledged a set of ‘isolated’ studies
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that signalled potential health effects.6 A majority of the French expert group con-
sidered that these studies did not invalidate the general conclusion that mobile
phone antennas presented no risks; but a minority thought otherwise and suggested
a more precautious wording. The head of the agency, when writing up the advice to
the government, sided with the latter and concluded that these studies revealed
uncertainties that had not been properly recognized before, and accordingly justiﬁed
applying the ALARA (as low as reasonably achievable) principle.
The second category of knowledge comprises social and economic sciences.
These can be used, in particular, to assess the beneﬁts of a technology. For the
moment, Europe and its member states stand in contrast with the US, where cost–
beneﬁt analysis was introduced in the late 1970s–early 1980s to supplement risk
analysis. The situation is slowly changing, with the REACH (Registration, Evalua-
tion, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemical substances) directive providing for
a socio-economic analysis,7 and initiatives regarding GMO in the UK (GM
Nation?) and France (High authority on biotechnologies). However, even in the
case of mobile telephony, a progressive shift towards social and economic sciences
can be witnessed, in research programmes, scientiﬁc committees and expert groups.
Initially, social sciences were ushered in to provide insights into the public’s risk
perceptions, and advice on risk acceptability and risk communication (e.g. the UK
and Spain). However, it quickly appeared that risk perception, far from being a dri-
ver of the issue, was a result of the way in which the issue had been handled, in
particular due to lack of trust in experts and public authorities. Hence, it became
necessary to probe deeper into the mechanisms that could explain the emergence of
the issue. The French environmental health safety agency recognized the need to
involve social sciences in the expert process, in order to achieve a better under-
standing of the controversy around mobile telephony. The French Health and Radio-
frequencies Foundation and the British Mobile Telecommunications and Health
Research programme (MTHR) also recognized the need to provide more social sci-
ence input, in particular on the modalities and motives of protest against antennas.
The third type of knowledge is the most controversial. It covers practical knowl-
edge, individual experience, ‘lay knowledge’ (Wynne 1996) and ‘anecdotal evi-
dence’ (Moore and Stilgoe 2009). These are forms of knowledge that are not
considered legitimate by scientists or public authorities, but are often deemed trust-
worthy by lay individuals – and can in some cases provide new insights that scien-
tists may have overlooked. In the case of mobile telephony, the Stewart report in
2000 decided to take into consideration, alongside scientiﬁc studies, individual
experiences provided by letters and accounts voiced during public meetings. The
introduction of such ‘anecdotal evidence’, along with other sources of data (includ-
ing a media survey), led the expert group to consider that many uncertainties
remained around the issue, calling for a precautionary approach (Stilgoe 2004). It
also led to a research programme (MTHR) that took into account anecdotal evi-
dence to deﬁne new research priorities.
These three broad types of knowledge constitute a major challenge to expert
procedures whose primary objective is to reduce uncertainties, since in most cases
they produce new uncertainties. However, this is necessary in order to explore the
limits of the known and unknown unknowns. In so doing, they also contribute to a
redeﬁnition of the boundaries between what is scientiﬁc and what is not scientiﬁc
(Moore and Stilgoe 2009). This redeﬁnition is highly contested, between those who
argue in favour of ‘sound science’, i.e. a closed and traditional approach to the pro-
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bringing in different types of knowledge and knowledge carriers (Callon,
Lascoumes, and Barthe 2009). In the UK, for instance, the Stewart report embar-
rassed the ministries of health and industry that decided not to follow the
precautionary approach advocated by the report. They asked the Advisory Group
on Non-Ionising Radiation (AGNIR) of the National Radiation Protection Board
(NRPB) for an update of the Stewart report: relying solely on strict scientiﬁc data,
AGNIR stated that mobile phone antennas presented no risk and that the UK should
adopt the ICNIRP and EU standards (something it had done a few years before
already).8 In an unparalleled move, William Stewart, who in the meantime had
become chair of the board of NRPB, produced his own report in which he repeated
the conclusions of his 2000 report and denounced the lack of appropriate measures
by the government and, indirectly, the limited scientiﬁc position adopted by the
NRPB experts.9 He also argued in favour of a risk evaluation integrating scientiﬁc
and socio-economic data.
Providers of knowledge
Each category of knowledge calls for a speciﬁc type of actor to provide input.
Regarding the ﬁrst category, alongside scientists, the providers of knowledge
can be alternative experts, ‘outsiders’ or ‘outcasts’ of the scientiﬁc community. On
mobile telephony, alternative experts were never a part of an expert group, but some
were auditioned. An interesting exception is Belgium, where a well-known ‘coun-
ter-expert’,10 who had openly spoken out against the risks of radiofrequencies, was
asked to write a report alongside two other experts: public authorities wanted to
demonstrate their openness in the aftermath of several food scandals that had shed
doubts on the credibility of experts. Not surprisingly, the three individual reports
arrived at different conclusions. This led the government to consider that, given the
uncertainties (as illustrated by the disagreements between experts), it was necessary
to apply the precautionary principle. Elsewhere, activists organized shadow expert
groups that produced reports challenging the ofﬁcial reports, both on their lack of
independence and their use of peer-reviewed data only (the BioInitiative report
being the most famous). In turn, some public authorities and courts (e.g. in France
in early 2009) were led to consider that the existence of diverging reports (whatever
their origin and authors) implied the persistence of uncertainties, hence justiﬁed
applying the precautionary principle.
The second category comprises sociologists, political scientists, economists, law-
yers or psychologists. In general, they are auditioned, eventually asked to carry risk
perception studies, but rarely invited to be experts. One reason for this is that social
scientists are suspected of representing the objects they study: economists are
accused of bringing in economic interests in expert groups; sociologists of defend-
ing the positions of social movements or victim organizations. Nonetheless, some
social scientists have recently joined expert groups: in France, a political scientist, a
psychologist and a psycho-sociologist joined the expert group on mobile telephony
in the French environmental health safety agency (Afsset) in 2009. However, when
they do join expert committees, the expectations they foster can be quite diverse:
from providing knowledge on the social dynamics of risk issues, to explaining risk
perceptions, providing insights on risk communication and acceptability, suggesting
psychological explanations to people’s fears, analysing the policy process, or talking
on behalf of the interested parties! These multiple demands reveal the need to
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deﬁne more precisely the exact nature of the knowledge provided and to shape the
other experts’ expectations of what social sciences can actually provide.
The third category is potentially the largest. It is made up of NGOs, individuals,
patient organizations, or professional organizations. These players can be collective
or individual, representing a cause or simply experts in a given ﬁeld, acting on
behalf of their own interests or for a larger cause. The Stewart committee in the
UK thus included two lay members, who had no speciﬁc knowledge of the issue
being discussed. The latest Afsset expert group on mobile telephony allowed one
NGO representative to sit in and listen to the discussions between experts – with
opportunities for voicing his own concerns and questions, but with no say on the
ﬁnal report. In general, the ‘interested parties’ are auditioned. However, there is a
growing recognition that they must be involved in the process, if public authorities
want to ensure that the outcome receives wider support. For instance, the French
Health and Radiofrequencies Foundation organized regular meetings with activists
in order to discuss research priorities, the programme of its annual conference, and
the selection of research projects. This slowly led to the recognition that these
actors were legitimate in addressing their questions to researchers.
All these actors have different interests, values and worldviews. Hence, bringing
them together, for instance in a committee, produces conﬂicts and tensions, in other
words more uncertainty, at least in the initial stages. Expert procedures have rarely
been designed to include such actors; they are adapted to scientists who have
already accepted the procedures’ constraints and role deﬁnitions. Indeed, the selec-
tion process aims at recruiting experts who not only present all the necessary cre-
dentials, but also can be expected to behave according to the rules, both implicit
and explicit, of the expert body. The three categories of actors mentioned above fall
outside these criteria, at least initially, and this creates tensions that bring into ques-
tion not only the procedures used to recruit experts but also the rules that govern
the expert group.
Procedures
The production of knowledge and recommendations on risk issues requires a set of
procedures, rules, and institutions that provide legitimacy to the process. These are
both scientiﬁc and democratic, as illustrated by some recent experimentation.
Scientiﬁc procedures deﬁne how expertise should be organized so that its claims
will be seen as legitimate by authorities and the public. The questions that must be
addressed herein concern not only the types of knowledge and actors that should be
involved in the production of expertise, but also the manner in which they should
be involved. What is at stake is the deﬁnition of ‘a new body of standards of proof,
correctness, truth and agreement in science’ (Beck 1998), that gives more weight in
particular to uncertainties than established facts.
This can be illustrated by the decision by the French environmental health safety
agency not to follow the majority of experts’ conclusions on mobile telephony and
to consider, along with a minority of experts, that a limited number of studies point-
ing at a potential health hazard justiﬁed the use of a precautionary approach. This
triggered a controversy with the larger scientiﬁc community, as it was perceived as
giving more weight to a limited number of studies, which moreover were not con-
sidered entirely rigorous, against a larger number of validated scientiﬁc studies.
However, this advice needs to be set within a new frame of reference: by adopting
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some, even inconclusive evidence, against the bulk of available knowledge: even
when the risk is not demonstrated, reducing emissions to lower, economically
acceptable and technically feasible levels of exposure, was presented as a legitimate
move. This suggests that new scientiﬁc procedures may be needed to address
emerging risks, procedures that encapsulate political choices and values, and give
more weight to the uncertainties when analysing new technologies.
Democratic procedures deﬁne how policymakers will use scientiﬁc advice. With
emerging risks, they face two challenges.
The ﬁrst deals with closure. On GMO and radiofrequencies, public authorities
have come to realize that these issues would not disappear. Hence, they need to
organize decision-making procedures that do not aim for closure, but maintain the
controversy open but stabilized. One way to achieve this is to provide institutional
form to ‘dialogical engagement’ and to invent institutions ‘which allow us to moni-
tor technological change’ (Giddens 1998). Another is to invent procedures that
allow for the reversibility of decisions (Callon, Lascoumes, and Barthe 2009). This
does not imply that some form of closure will not be achieved; it suggests that the
possibility to revise decisions according to new evidence, for instance, be acknowl-
edged and institutionalized from the beginning (Wynne 2001).
The second challenge concerns uncertainty. The entire decision-making process
is focused on reducing uncertainties in order to provide a viable solution. Yet, on
emerging risks, the uncertainties are too numerous and moreover diverse for this
goal to be achieved, at least initially. Furthermore, in most cases, these uncertainties
are not easily reducible, but on the contrary, call for different methods of delibera-
tion, knowledge production and stakeholder engagement. All this implies that previ-
ously depoliticized areas of decision-making become politicized (Beck 1998). In
other words, uncertainties must be initially acknowledged in their diversity before
undertaking a process of reduction.
In the case of mobile telephony, two recent examples highlight these challenges.
The ﬁrst initiative took place in Sweden. Between 2004 and 2005, a ‘Transpar-
ency forum for mobile phone communication’ brought together stakeholders in
small workshops, with an open-ended mandate and the objective of facilitating
mutual understanding between the different protagonists (Lezaun and Soneryd
2007). In the course of the meetings, they learned to know each other better,
showed signs of mutual respect for each other’s position (even if they disapproved
of them), and began discussing technical issues. An evaluation of the initiative in
2006 suggests that, on the basis of positive results on individual participants who
learned to engage in a dialogue over a contentious issue, the Swedish radiation pro-
tection authority (SSI) should create a more permanent forum for continued dia-
logue. Yet, if the initiative proved fruitful in bringing together the different
stakeholders, it does not seem to have had any effective impact on the decision-
making process, at least for the time being. This is in part due to the fact that SSI
did ‘not seem particularly willing to be itself moved by the process of consultation’
(Lezaun and Soneryd 2007, 292).
The second example, in France, presents some similarities, yet could achieve
different results. The Roundtable on radiofrequencies and health started out in
piecemeal fashion. Created at the beginning of 2009 in the aftermath of several
court decisions that required mobile phone operators to take down their antennas,
the initiative was expected to come rapidly to a solution in order to avoid all
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50,000 antennas becoming a source of litigation. The roundtable comprised repre-
sentatives of all the potential stakeholders, members of the different ministries and
public agencies, elected ofﬁcials and ‘qualiﬁed persons’ (two sociologists and a
legal scholar) – but no scientists. It met on a regular basis with no clear rules, a
vague list of subjects to cover, no speciﬁc procedures. The meetings were chaired
in a very loose fashion, the president letting each participant voice his opinion or
concerns, but carefully avoiding any debate. In June 2009, the roundtable came up
with series proposals to create several speciﬁc subcommittees. After the summer,
the roundtable began meeting again. It became clear that the different participants
were actually eager to continue discussing, not the science, but other aspects related
to mobile telephony (roll-out of antennas, measures of exposure, information to the
public, research priorities), in other words to ‘monitor technological change’. The
question remains as to what the government will and can actually do with the work
produced by the roundtable and its subcommittees. But one can expect that, as
some forms of consensus arise on certain topics, it will be hard for the government
not to take these into account.
What is interesting in both cases is that authorities chose to recruit stakeholders
rather than representatives of the general public; in other words, actors already
involved, knowledgeable and with clearly deﬁned interests, rather than lay citizens
with no clear ideas, let alone positions (this was the case, on the other hand, with
GMO and nanotechnologies in France and the UK, with limited success). These
actors, during the course of the discussions, learned to interact with each other. Far
from reaching any sort of consensus, this simply made it easier for the different par-
ties to get to know each other, anticipate their behaviours and responses, in other
words become less unpredictable. In turn, this made it possible for them to interact
on speciﬁc topics, such as measurement instruments and campaigns, something that
had been hitherto impossible.
Both experiences provided the different actors with an opportunity to explore
the different uncertainties related to mobile telephony. The question remains open
whether or not this will lead to decisions and whether or not these will provide for
some sort of reversibility in the future, should new evidence surface. But the French
initiative seems headed in this direction, with the roundtable and its subgroups
meeting on a regular basis, while the new National health safety agency (Anses), a
merger of Afsset and the Food safety agency in 2010, is setting up both a perma-
nent working group on radiofrequencies, whose tasks will be to revise annually the
state of the science and to monitor new evidence provided by research, and a com-
mittee of stakeholders charged with providing input in the research process (a con-
tinuation of the one created by the French Health and Radiofrequencies Foundation,
now a part of Anses).
Conclusion
Three general conclusions can be drawn from the preceding discussion.
First, the success of a general discourse on risk, or what has been referred to as
‘risk colonization’ (Rothstein, Huber, and Gaskell 2006), cannot be explained by
the fact that public problems today are more uncertain than before. Rather, the
reverse claim can be made: as risk has become an ‘organizing concept’ (ibid.), it
has fostered the idea that ofﬁcials today face problems that are more complex and
uncertain. This paradox can be understood using the case of mobile telephony: it is
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not so much the initial uncertainties that warranted the use of a risk framework,
rather it is the use of such a framework that helped produce, reveal or amplify
numerous uncertainties; in turn, these called for the adoption of more risk instru-
ments. Hence, risk and uncertainty mutually reinforce each other. As risk spreads
throughout public administrations, both as an organizing concept and as a way of
framing a variety of issues, this reveals uncertainties that actors were not initially
aware of; in turn, these uncertainties justify adopting risk instruments in order to
provide guidelines for decision-makers; this leads to the recognition of further
uncertainties, for example relating to the decision-makers’ reputation; these institu-
tional risks become potential sources of additional uncertainties; etc.
Second, the driver behind this self-perpetuating dynamics is the gap between the
risk instruments used to address issues, and the multiple uncertainties that have con-
tributed to put and sustain these issues on the agenda. In particular, the adoption of
techniques that seek to reduce uncertainties has fuelled ongoing controversies. The
more governments and experts put forward ‘puriﬁed’ (i.e. unbiased) techniques des-
tined to produce robust scientiﬁc advice, the more they produce, reveal or amplify
additional uncertainties that are used by the different protagonists to keep the issue
alive. This cannot be explained solely by a lack of trust in experts and government
ofﬁcials; rather we must analyse the nature of the evidence that is used and how it
relates to wider debates.
Third, reducing this gap has been a major concern for governments. We dis-
cussed the development of more pluralist approaches to expertise in the ﬁeld of
health and environmental risks; where pluralism concerns the types of knowledge,
the providers of knowledge and the procedures that are used to produce the evi-
dence. An assessment of the impact of these pluralist approaches in the ﬁeld of
mobile telephony suggests that they can provide more robust evidence to policy-
makers, in particular since they do not deny the political nature of the issues at
hand. Yet it is still too early to tell if the different initiatives mentioned above will
have a deeper impact – or if they will simply contribute to a dispersion and dilution
of institutional risks. They may very well remain ‘talking shop’ initiatives, situated
on the margins of decision-making procedures, and designed to attract attention,
keep the opponents busy and to demonstrate the authorities’ desire to engage in dia-
logical forms of governance. Yet, this presupposes that the stakeholders engaged in
these initiatives are either naïve or simply interested in being offered a stool in the
policymaking process: experience shows that this is not the case, and that they have
learned to use the media and the courts to state their claims and become active
players.
Two other elements, meanwhile, suggest deeper forms of resistance. First, these
evolutions imply a transformation in national styles of policymaking, institutional
arrangements and even ‘civic epistemologies’ (Jasanoff 2005), in particular regard-
ing what is considered an ‘acceptable’ scientiﬁc argument in the policymaking pro-
cess. In other words, the problem is not so much the integration of the knowledge
produced by these initiatives in the decision-making process, than their acceptance
by wider audiences as legitimate statements and claims. These audiences include
the public, courts, the media and academia. Second, policymakers and the public
need to invest time and energy in solving issues that may not be considered priori-
ties in terms of health or the environment. Many would argue that public authorities
should establish clear priorities and invest time and energy only in the ‘real’ prob-
lems. Yet this would miss a key point, which is that risk problems are always more
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than just about health or environmental risks. And it is precisely by addressing their
different uncertainties that these wicked problems can be redeﬁned into more proper
terms, i.e. social issues with a strong health or environmental dimension.
Notes
1. Ultimately the plaintiff lost, on the grounds that there was not enough scientiﬁc evi-
dence to suggest a causal link. But the lawsuit spurred the mobile phone manufacturers
into ﬁnancing a large research programme to investigate potential health effects between
1993 and 1999. This indirectly ampliﬁed the controversy, as the head of the programme
went public in 1999, stating that some of the results suggested a possible link between
the handsets and brain tumours. Immediately removed from the programme, he became
one of the more outspoken whistleblowers of a health risk linked to mobile telephony.
2. Recommendation of the European Union Council on limiting exposure of the general
public to electromagnetic ﬁelds, 12 July 1999.
3. International Commission on Non-Ionising Radiation Protection.
4. Independent expert group on mobile phones, Mobile phones and health, 2000, p. 25.
5. BioInitiative Working Group, BioInitiative Report: A rationale for a biologically-based
public exposure standard for electromagnetic ﬁelds (ELF and RF), D. Carpenter and C.
Sage (eds.), 2007. The report, published on the Internet, is a collection of articles, with
a conclusion and set of recommendations by the two editors. Its aim is to reduce the
exposure levels below existing international standards.
6. Les radiofréquences. Mise à jour de l’expertise relative aux radiofréquences, Afsset,
2009.
7. Within the European Chemical Agency (ECHA), socio-economic analysis is expected
to play an important role in the authorization and restriction processes.
8. Health effects from radiofrequency electromagnetic ﬁelds, Report of an independent
advisory group on non-ionising radiation, NRPB, 14(2), 2003.
9. Mobile phones and health 2004, Report by the board of NRPB, NRPB, 15(5), 2004.
10. Jean-Marie Danze had previously worked on the health effects of high voltage power-
lines and was close to the Belgian NGO Teslabel active against different sources of
electromagnetic pollution.
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